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Abstract 
This paper models the prices decision process of a one supplier and multiple retailers supply chain considering different product 
substitution degrees and retailer amount. Then we analyze the optimal prices for the supplier and the retailers, as well as their 
influencing factors under both decentralized and centralized decision-making process. The results indicate that:ķ  For the 
wholesale price of raw materials under the decentralized mode, both of the rigid demand of retailing market and the retailer 
amount act positive effect while retailers’ sub-packaging cost acts  negative one. ĸ For the retail prices of the products under 
both decentralized and centralized mode, the rigid demand and sub-packaging costs make positive effect. However, the sub-
packaging costs of other competitors have negative effect on the retail price under decentralized mode but acts positive one under 
the centralized mode. This paper also reveals the uncertainty of the effect from the product substitution degree through numerical 
analysis. Finally, specific countermeasures for the government are provided according to the perspective of the analyzed factors 
in order to ensure the welfare of consumers and promote the development of the industry. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of KES International. 
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1. Introduction 
Currently in China, most products are decentralized through the supply chain of one supplier to multiple 
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downstream merchants. (For simplicity, we use the word retailers when referring to downstream merchants in the 
remainder of the paper). Raw materials or primary products provide by one supplier would be just sub-packaged 
(some times made few simply processing) by its retailers before releasing to retail markets. Therefore, in the retail 
market these kinds of product are substitutable. For instance, in the vintage Chinese spirit supply chain in China, 
retailers buy the raw spirit from suppliers at wholesale then sell them in their own brands. As a result, vintage spirits 
of several brands are substitutable. Under this situation, the raw material prices and the products retail prices would 
be influenced by retailer amount, product substitute, and sub-packaging costs. And these factors directly concern 
consumers’ welfare that is influenced by prices and products competition. Even more, they would affect the quality 
of products and the development of the industry. 
Many scholars have already analyzed the optimal prices for the whole supply chains as well as the pricing issues 
between suppliers (or manufacturers) and retailers (Liang et al.,2005; Wang and Xu,2005; Hu et al.,2006; 
Wang,2006; Wu et al.,2008; Liao et al.,2009; Niu et al.,2011; Pu et al.,2013). For example, Weng (1995) and Deng 
(2006) have studied the quantity discount contract and the coordination between price and output when a certain 
product has price sensitive demand. Wang (2006) has analyzed suppliers’ output and the decision-making of prices 
given the multiple manufacturers to a single retailer situation and completely complementary relation among 
products. It can be seen that the studies of two-echelon supply chain with one supplier to multi-retailers or multi-
suppliers to one retailer under different substitutability conditions have been fruitful. However, for the one supplier 
and multi-retailer supply chain, the work for analyzing the optimal price of upstream suppliers and downstream 
retailers and its influencing factors considering the products substitution and marketing scale for both in 
decentralized and centralized mode should be further studied.  
This paper developed models for maximizing profits of suppliers and retailers and analyzed their optimal prices 
and corresponding influencing factors. Managerial insights under different circumstances are made for suppliers and 
retailers in one supplier and multiple retailers supply chain to ensure the welfare of consumers and promote sound 
development of the industry. Our research in this paper intends to address the following questions: 
z What are the optimal prices for suppliers and retailers under decentralized mode? 
z How product substitution degree, retailer amount affect the optimal prices for suppliers and retailers under 
decentralized mode? 
z What are the optimal prices for suppliers and retailers under centralized mode? 
z How product substitution degree, retailer amount affect the optimal prices for suppliers and retailers under 
centralized mode? 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the pricing models for suppliers and retailers under both 
decentralized and centralized mode are proposed. Then we make the numerical study for evaluating the influencing 
factors of the optimal prices in section 3. Finally, conclusions and suggestions of the paper are presented in Section 
4.  
2. The optimal prices for suppliers and retailers under decentralized and centralized mode  
A supplier sells its raw materials on wholesale to n  retailers, and then these retailers simply process and package 
the raw materials and sell them in the retailing market. Retailers’ products are substitutable. Moreover, the retail 
market demand equals to the raw material supplies. Suppose the products are not necessities of life, the products 
have limited market demand and the raw materials provided by suppliers could fully satisfy the downstream 
retailers’ needs. The sequence of game is that the supplier provides n  retailers with raw materials of fixed 
wholesale price w , and then each retailer determines the retail prices of their products to maximize profits. 
Therefore, backward induction method is employed to analyze suppliers and retailers’ optimal prices and profits. 
The market demand iq (Acocella et al., 2009) of product i  is: 
1
(1 )
1
n
i i j
j i
j
rq r p p
n
D
z 
     ¦                                                                                                                          (1) 
r  is the product substitution degree (For simplicity without loss of generality, we use 
1
r
n   to represent the 
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average degree of substitution among products); D is the rigid demand; ip is the retail price of product i  
( 1, ,i n ). 
The profit of retailer i  can be obtained as follows: 
( ) ( )i i i i ip p c w qS                                                                                                                                      (2) 
ic  represents the unit sub-packaging cost of product i  ( 1, ,i n ). 
Accordingly, the raw material supplier’s profit is  
1
( )
n
S i
i
w w qS
 
 ¦                                                                                                                                                (3) 
2.1. Optimal prices under decentralized mode  
Proposition 1. 
(i) The rigid demand (the demand would not be affected by price factors) of retail market has positive effect on 
the wholesale price of raw material suppliers.  
 (ii) The downstream sub-packaging costs have negative effect on the wholesale price.  
 (iii) The retailer amount has positive effect on the wholesale price.  
 
Proof. 
When the raw material supplier and the downstream retailers are profit independently, they make pricing 
decisions according individually to maximize their profits. Deducing from first order optimal condition 0i
i
d
dp
S   of 
formula (2) for retailer i ’s maximal profit, we could get: 
1
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        ¦    1, ,i n                                                                               (4) 
The second order optimal condition is still satisfied, that is
2
2 2(1 ) 0
i
i
d r
dp
S     . 
It can be concluded by summing the n  retailers’ corresponding formula (4) 
1
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Substitute it into formula (4) and it can be concluded: 
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The profit expression of raw material suppliers can be concluded by substituting formula (6) and (7) into formula 
(3). 
1
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                                                                                                                         (8) 
Raw material suppliers determine their wholesale price according to their own maximized profit. It can be 
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concluded from the first order optimal condition 0Sd
dw
S   of formula (8). 
1
( 1)( 2 )
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                                                                                                                               (9) 
The second order optimal condition is stilled satisfied, that is
2
2
2 ( 1) 0
2
Sd n r
dw r
S    . Therefore the raw material 
suppliers’ optimal wholesale price is  
* 1
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                                                                                                                                                 (10) 
It can be seen from formula (10) that * 1 0
2
w
D
w  !w
, * 1 0
2i
w
c n
w   w
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The explanations of the proposition 1 as follows: 
Firstly, the growing of the rigid demand would stimulate the demand of upstream raw materials. Due to the 
supply-demand relationship, the wholesale prices of raw materials will inflate. 
Secondly, under the same condition, the increase of downstream sub-packaging costs will narrow retailers’ profit 
margin. Therefore, they would cut off the raw material purchasing costs by forcing raw material suppliers to lower 
the wholesale price. 
Thirdly, the enlarging of retailers group who sell substitutable products will intensify competition of the retail 
market. Meanwhile, their demand for upstream raw materials will also increase, which would lead to the inflation of 
the wholesale price. 
 
Proposition 2. 
(i) The rigid demand of retail market has positive effect on the retail price.  
(ii) The sub-packaging costs have positive effect on the retail price.  
(iii) For a retailer, sub-packaging costs of other competitors have negative effect on its retail price.  
Proof. 
By substituting formula (10) into formula (4), the optimal price of retailer i  is 
*
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From formula (11) it can be seen that
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The explanations of the proposition 2 as follows: 
Firstly, when the rigid demand increases, the retail price will go up as well. For instance, when the market 
demand driven from the factors like consumers’ following suit or self-dignity, the retail price will increase 
correspondingly. 
Secondly, because the growth of the sub-packaging costs would reduce the retailers’ profit, and the retailer would 
rise in price in order to balance the income.  
Thirdly, when competitors’ sub-packaging costs climb up, their retail prices will rise. Then the retailer would 
lower its price to create more demand in order to highlight the comparative advantage and generate more profits. 
 
Equation (12) could be obtained by solving the partial derivative of *
ip  from formula (11) with respect to n . 
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It is difficult to determine whether 
*
ip
n
w
w from formula (12) is positive or negative. Therefore, it is uncertain that 
whether the retailer amount has positive or negative effect on the optimal retail price in the decentralized mode. 
It can be concluded by solving the partial derivative of *
ip  from formula (11) with respect to r . 
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It is difficult to determine whether 
*
ip
r
w
w from formula (13) is positive or negative. Therefore, it could not be 
deduced that whether the products substitution degree in the decentralized mode has positive or negative effect on 
the optimal retail price. And in order to evaluate this effect, corresponding numerical study would be presented in 
Section 3. 
2.2. Optimal prices under centralized mode  
Proposition 3. 
(i) The optimal retail price under centralized mode is lower than the one under the decentralized mode. 
(ii) Similar with the decentralized mode, both rigid market demand and sub-packaging costs have positive effect 
on the retail price of product. 
(iii) Under the centralized mode, the other retailers’ sub-packaging costs have positive effect on a retailer’s retail 
price. And the retailer amount has negative effect on the retail price.  
Proof. 
In a centralized mode, the profit of the whole supply chain could be obtain by adding formula (2) and (3):  
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To maximize the profit, apply the first order optimal condition 0
ip
w  w
 to formula (14): 
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To satisfy the second order optimal condition, we make 2
2 2( 1) 0
i
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. Therefore, the optimal retail price of 
retailer i  is:  
**
( 1) (1 )[ 2( 1)]
2 ( 2)[(2 1) 2( 1)]
n
j i
j i
i
r r c r nr n c
p
r r n r n
D z         
¦
                                                                                       (16) 
Comparing **ip of the centralized mode with 
*
ip of the decentralized mode, we could 
see
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It can be seen from formula (16): ** 1 0
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The explanations of the proposition 3 as follows: 
It is because the retailers are in the same strategic alliance in a centralized supply chain. And according to the 
theory of scale effect, the increasing of the retailer amount would enlarge the overall profit of the supply chain and 
lower the retail price. The conclusions above are different with the ones under the decentralized mode, since the 
decision making of the wholesale price is ignored under the centralized mode. And the wholesale price is 
independent of the retailer amount. The negative effect of the retailer amount on the optimal retail price under the 
centralized mode that the larger the number of downstream retailers goes, the lower the retail price of the product 
will be, illustrates the advantages of a large industrial scale. 
By applying partial derivative of **ip  with respect to r  from formula (16), we could get: 
**
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It could not be determined that whether the **ip
r
w
w
from formula (17) is positive or negative. Therefore, the impact 
of the product substitution degree on the optimal retail price under the centralized mode is uncertain.  And in order 
to evaluate this effect, corresponding numerical study would be presented in Section 3. 
3. Numerical example 
In order to study how the retailer amount and the product substitution degrees impact on the optimal retail price, 
we set down the value of other parameters and compute the value of 
*
ip
n
w
w
 and 
*
ip
r
w
w
 separately. According to the 
assumptions and the variable implication in the model, let 0.1i jc c  , ( , 1, ,i j n ), 1D   for simplicity without 
loss of generality. Moreover, set the he number of retailers n  an integer that is no less than 3 and no more than 100 
( 3 100nd d ), since we consider the problem under the one supplier and multiple retailers supply chain. 
Accordingly, the impact of the retailer amount on the optimal retail price in the decentralized mode is shown in 
the following Table1: 
Table 1. The impact of the retailer amount on the optimal retail price *
ip under different product substitution degrees 
  n  0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1 
3 -0.0278 -0.0133 -0.0045 -0.0018 -0.0014 
10 -0.0200 -0.0087 0.0003 0.0048 0.0065 
20 -0.0113 -0.0050 0.0001 0.0027 0.0037 
30 -0.0078 -0.0035   0.000049 0.0019 0.0026 
40 -0.0059 -0.0027   0.000028 0.0014 0.0020 
50 -0.0048 -0.0022   0.000019 0.0012 0.0016 
60 -0.0040 -0.0018   0.000013 0.0010 0.0013 
70 -0.0035 -0.0016   0.000010 0.0008 0.0012 
80 -0.0030 -0.0014 0.000008 0.0007 0.0010 
90 -0.0027 -0.0012   0.000006 0.00065 0.0009 
100 -0.0025 -0.0011   0.000005 0.00060 0.0008 
 
It can be seen from table 1: The impact of retailer amount on the optimal retail prices differs from the product 
r  
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substitution degree. Depending on the parameter setting in this paper, we could get the following conclusions: 
(1) When the product substitution degree is 0 (extreme condition) or 0.2, 
*
ip
n
w
w
 is negative and its value goes up 
with the growth of n . It indicates that when the products have no or relatively low degree of substitution, the 
retailer amount has negative effect on the optimal retail price. That is to say the optimal retail price decreases while 
number of retailer increases. Moreover, the negative effect weakens when the number of retailers goes bigger. 
(2) Under the condition that the products substitution degree is no less than 0.5, 
*
ip
n
w
w
 is positive and its value 
decreases with the increase of n . *ip
n
w
w
 is negative if and only if when 3n  . This indicates that when the products 
have high substitution degree, the retailer amount has positive effect on the optimal retail price, that is to say the 
optimal retail price increases with number of retailers growing. Moreover, the positive effect weakens when the 
retailer amount is larger. 
The numerical result indicates that the effect of the retailer amount on the optimal retail price varies with the 
product substitution degree. This conclusion is different from the common one that the optimal retail price decreases 
with the growing of both the retailer amount and the product substitution degree, due to our research in this paper is 
based on the background of “one supplier to multiple retailers”. We could see that the supplier’s optimal wholesale 
price rises with the increase of the size of the retailer group. The wholesale price is one of major factors for the retail 
price decision. And the furious competition in the downstream retail sector makes the upstream raw material price 
go up and then the downstream retail price sees an upward-trend as well because of the cost increase of the raw 
material. However, when the product substitution degree is relatively high, the effect of the retailer amount turns 
negative after n ’ s exceeding a critical value (given 100n ! ). 
The effect of the product substitution degree on the optimal retail price in decentralized mode is shown in table 2 
Table 2. The effect of the products substitution degree on the optimal price *
ip  with different retailer amount 
r  3 20 50 80 100 
0.1 -0.1478 -0.1440 -0.1438 -0.1437 -0.1437 
0.2 -0.1451 -0.1388 -0.1383 -0.1382 -0.1382 
0.3 -0.1415 -0.1340 -0.1335 -0.1334 -0.1333 
0.4 -0.1369 -0.1297 -0.1292 -0.1290 -0.1290 
0.5 -0.1313 -0.1258 -0.1253 -0.1252 -0.1252 
0.6 -0.1248 -0.1221 -0.1218 -0.1217 -0.1217 
0.7 -0.1176 -0.1186 -0.1186 -0.1186 -0.1186 
0.8 -0.1099 -0.1152 -0.1156 -0.1157 -0.1157 
0.9 -0.1020 -0.1120 -0.1128 -0.1130 -0.1131 
1 -0.0941 -0.1089 -0.1102 -0.1106 -0.1107 
 
From Table 2 we could see that the effect of the product substitution degree on the optimal retail price differs 
from the retailer amount. Within the parameter range we set in this paper, it could be concluded that *ip
r
w
w
 remains 
negative varying the retailer amount. Moreover, given a retailer group size, *ip
r
w
w
increases with r . It shows that 
when fixing other parameters the product substation degree always has a negative effect on the optimal retail price 
no matter how large the retailer amount is. And this negative effect weakens with the rising of substitution degree. 
Same as the common situation, the conclusion in this part shows that the higher the products substitution degree and 
the more furious the competition in the retail market, the lower the retail price is with a fixed retailer amount. 
And in order to study this impact, we set the value of other parameters the same as we did under the decentralized 
n  
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mode and compute the value of 
**
ip
r
w
w
.  And the effect of the product substitution degree on the optimal retail price 
under the centralized mode is shown in table 3 
Table 3. The effect of the products substitution degree on the optimal price **
ip  with different retailer amount 
r  3 20 50 80 100 
0.1 -0.1973 -0.1982 -0.1982 -0.1982 -0.1982 
0.2 -0.1755 -0.1766 -0.1767 -0.1767 -0.1767 
0.3 -0.1579 -0.1588 -0.1589 -0.1589 -0.1589 
0.4 -0.1432 -0.1439 -0.1439 -0.1439 -0.1439 
0.5 -0.1307 -0.1311 -0.1311 -0.1311 -0.1311 
0.6 -0.1198 -0.1200 -0.1200 -0.1200 -0.1200 
0.7 -0.1104 -0.1104 -0.1104 -0.1104 -0.1104 
0.8 -0.1021 -0.1019 -0.1018 -0.1018 -0.1018 
0.9 -0.0947 -0.0943 -0.0943 -0.0943 -0.0943 
1 -0.0881 -0.0876 -0.0875 -0.0875 -0.0875 
 
Table 3 shows that impact on the optimal retail price from the product substitution degree varies with the retailer 
amount. And similar to the conclusion under the decentralized mode, the **ip
r
w
w
 remains negative with the variation of 
the retailer amount under the presetting parameter value ranges. Furthermore, given a retailer amount, **ip
r
w
w
increases 
with r . And when the product substitution degree is relatively low, its negative effect on the retail price under 
centralized mode is much stronger that the one under decentralized mode. However, with the increase the product 
substitution degree, its negative effect on the retail price weakens substantially. The reason is under the centralized 
mode, the supplier and retailers are strategic alliances who have the same target of maximizing the overall profit in 
the supply chain. As the decision for wholesale prices is ignored, the impact from the factor of products substitution 
is much stronger under the centralized mode. 
4. Main conclusion and suggestions 
This paper models the prices decision process and analyzes the optimal prices for the supplier and the retailers in 
a one supplier and multiple retailers supply chain considering different product substitution degrees and retailer 
amount. The main conclusion indicates that firstly, both rigid demand and retailer amount have positive effect 
whereas the sub-packaging costs have negative effect in the decentralized mode, for the wholesale price of raw 
materials; secondly, the rigid demand and sub-packaging costs have positive effect in both decentralized and 
centralized mode, for the retailing price of the products. The difference is that the sub-packaging costs of other 
competitors have negative effect in the decentralized mode and positive effect in the centralized mode. According to 
the main conclusion, the optimal prices for the supplier and retailers are determined by the retailer amount, the 
product substitution degree, the sub-packaging costs and the rigid market demand in the one supplier and multiple 
retailers supply chain. Based on the effect of these factors on the optimal wholesale price for raw materials and retail 
price for products, the following suggestions are proposed for the government. 
4.1. The suggestion from the facet of the retailers 
 For retailers’ sub-packaging costs, the government should monitor the sub-packaging process of products, not 
only for banning toxic material but also for preventing over packaging. It is because that the increase of sub-
packaging costs will make the retail price rising, which will narrow the profit margin of the upstream raw material 
n  
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supplier and decrease the raw material wholesale price. It might harm the supply chain since the supplier might use 
inferior materials to make up this gap.  
For retailers amount, under the decentralized mode, the government should monitor the number of downstream 
retailers according to the product substitution degree. When the substitution degree is relatively low, the government 
should loose market access rule, appropriately increase the retailer amount and promoting fair competition among 
them. When the substitution degree is relatively high, the retailer amount should be controlled. Under the centralized 
mode, the number of retailers should be properly increased to take the advantage of industrial scale, which will 
benefit the sound development of the industry. 
4.2. The suggestion from the facet of the consumers 
The rigid market demand will increase when consumers have preference on or follow suit to a certain kind of 
non-necessities. Then the raw material wholesale price and the product retail price will go up as well, which will 
harm consumers’ welfare. Therefore, the government should spread the knowledge of product consumption, and 
guide consumers to consume rationally rather than following suit blindly, by different mediums of the media, the 
consumers’ association and related public organizations. Then we can keep the wholesale price of raw material and 
the retail price of product at a reasonable level and maintain good competition relationships among retailers. 
4.3. The suggestion from the facet of the product substitution degree 
Under both decentralized and centralized mode, the government should encourage the increasing of the product 
substitution degree. Because it could not only provide consumers more choices, but also help decrease the retail 
price. Especially, it would benefit for the supplier and improve the quality of raw materials under decentralized 
mode. 
4.4. The other facets’ suggestion  
The government should cultivate a rational competition among downstream retailers and maintain a good market 
rules in the decentralized mode where the raw material supplier and retailers are not integrated. And this move 
would not only stimulate retailers to increase the quality of their services and products but also guarantee 
consumers’ welfare by lowing the retail price. And when the retailer amount is relatively large, the government 
should monitor the supplier of controlling the wholesale price at a reasonable level. When the retailer amount is 
small, attention should be paid on the quality of supplier’s raw materials. 
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